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This paper advances the study of Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010) by examining the shareholder value efﬁ-
ciency and its determinants for a large sample of Japanese banks between 1999 and 2011. A new, specif-
ically tailored measure of the Economic Value Added approach, based on the shadow price of equity, is
developed in order to account for speciﬁc characteristics of the Japanese banking system. This new
‘‘shareholder value measure’’ is then used in a dynamic panel data model as a linear function of various
bank-risk, bank-speciﬁc, and macroeconomic variables. This study ﬁnds that cost efﬁciency gains, credit
risk and bank size are the most important factors in explaining the shareholder value creation in Japanese
banking. Cost efﬁciency changes are also found to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence cost of equity capital.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The Japanese banking sector is one of the most important bank-
ing sectors worldwide. As a consequence, there is a well-estab-
lished and growing literature that focuses on various factors that
inﬂuence the performance of banks in Japan (see for example,
Altunbas et al., 2000; Drake et al., 2009; Barros et al., 2012). The
recent focus on the performance analysis of Japanese banks has
predominantly been motivated by the complex economic environ-
ment in which these banks operate. Macroeconomic stagnation in
the last two decades, combined with uncontrolled credit expan-
sion, lack of capital and the extremely large volumes of non-per-
forming loans, caused severe ﬁnancial crises in the Japanese
economy (Caballero et al., 2008). It is, therefore, not surprising that
the performance analysis of Japanese banks continues to receive
academic interest.
A large number of papers (Berger and Mester, 2003;
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Brissimis et al., 2008; Lepetit et al.,
2008; Liu and Wilson, 2010) focus on bank proﬁts by analyzing the
impact of a wide range of factors (bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc
andmacroeconomic).However, thenotionof ‘‘proﬁtability’’ (usually
measuredby theReturnonAssets–ROAandReturnonEquity–ROE)is insufﬁcient to assess bank stability since it does not consider the
level of risk-taken. Speciﬁcally, the interpretation of high proﬁtabil-
ity ratios is ambiguous: it can both be interpreted as a signal of bank
soundness or as a consequence of a high risk taking.
While there is a well-established and growing literature that
focuses on the various factors that inﬂuence the performance of
banks, only a handful of studies use value creation metrics as a per-
formance indicator. Only a few studies have sought to link mea-
sures of bank productive efﬁciency to shareholder value and
generally found a positive relationship. Fiordelisi (2007) developed
a new measure of shareholder performance, where a bank produc-
ing the maximum possible Economic Value Added is deﬁned as
‘‘shareholder value efﬁcient’’. Beccalli et al. (2006) examined the
relationship between stock returns and various efﬁciency mea-
sures, generally ﬁnding a positive link between return and
improvements in efﬁciency.
This paper is motivated by all the above considerations. The aim
is to extend the literature through examining Japanese banks
shareholder value efﬁciency and its determinants by offering three
important contributions. First, in this study we use a Stochastic
Frontier model that accounts for risk (and NPLs) and asset quality
factors in measuring and analysing the shareholder value efﬁciency
of Japanese banks. This is an important contribution, since most
studies that examine bank efﬁciency in Japan mainly apply non-
parametric methods represented by DEA (see for example,
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paper is one of the few studies that applied a parametric method
for measuring Japanese bank efﬁciency. The literature clearly dis-
cusses that NPLs are an undesirable by-product and that ignoring
them might lead to biased conclusions (Fukuyama and Weber,
2008; Barros et al., 2012).
Secondly, we provide a shadow price of equity as a measure of
cost of capital. We posit that the use of simple stock returns as a
measure of shareholder value may be overstated and misleading.
This novel measure of shadow price of equity enables us to include
both listed and non-listed banks in our analysis.
Thirdly, we analyse a broad range of factors impacting on the
shareholder value creation in Japanese banking by empirically test-
ing the causality of these factors in the value creation process. We
also take into account the trade-offs between various efﬁciency
measures (i.e. cost, revenue, proﬁt and shareholder efﬁciency).
Contrary to the existing literature, which focuses on the relation-
ship between shareholder value and just one type of bank-speciﬁc
determinant (i.e. bank efﬁciency), we examine multiple factors
that may inﬂuence shareholder returns (such as bank’s risk-taking,
cost of capital, macroeconomic conditions, etc.).1
Lastly, we also contribute to the banking literature on Japan by
using recent data and focusing on an interesting period character-
ized by restructuring and consolidation. We use a unique dataset
from 1999 to 2011, which enables us not only to examine the dif-
ferences in bank shareholder efﬁciency between various bank
types, but also to check for shareholder value trade-off between
listed and non-listed banks.3 This marks a return of Japanese banks to the position that they held in late 1980s,
when Japanese banks’ share of the cross-border claims of all BIS reporting banks
peaked at no less than 36% in 1989. For more info please see BIS Quarterly Review,
September 2013.
4 For more information on the market structure, please see Bank of Japan.
52. Japanese banking system – an overview
Recapitalization, the continuous consolidation process of the
ﬁnancial market and the never-ending ﬁnancial crisis has been
widely discussed in academic literature (see for example, Fukao,
2007; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Overall, in the last two decades
we can distinguish three crisis phases in Japan. The ﬁrst phase of
the crisis occurred during 1991–1997 and was characterized by
the bubble burst and the beginning of gradual and reluctant inter-
ventions by the Japanese government. During the second phase,
1997–1999, which saw the almost total collapse of the Japanese
ﬁnancial market, the government ﬁnally accepted the true extent
of the crisis and implemented more systematic measures to
address extreme credit squeeze and a sharp growth contraction.
Finally, the period 1999–2003 was characterized by intensive con-
solidation of the banking sector, but the problems of credit misal-
location and economic stagnation continued. Evidence on the
performance of the Japanese banking system after the long eco-
nomic downturn and various recessions during the last two dec-
ades is somewhat mixed. Few studies found gradual
improvements in proﬁtability of Japanese banks as a result of these
phases (see for example, Loukoianova, 2008; Liu and Wilson,
2010), while other studies explain the persistently poor perfor-
mance with a continuous deﬂationary macroeconomic environ-
ment, low margins charged on loans and high labor costs (Oyama
and Shiratori, 2001; Kashyap, 2002; Hattori et al., 2007). As a result
new measures were introduced in recent years on further normal-
ization of the non-performing loan problem (for example, 2004
Financial Reform Program; ban on pay-offs lifted in 2005), and
additional measures to stabilize the ﬁnancial system (for example,
Financial Functions Strengthening Act; and Deposit Insurance Act
amendments in 2013).21 Failure to accommodate for various distortions in Japanese economy might lead
to biased results (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).
2 For more info, please see Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan.According to BIS Quarterly Review (2013) Japanese banks are
back to being the largest international lenders, when at the end-
March 2013 Japanese banks’ share in the consolidated interna-
tional claims of all BIS reporting banks rose to 13%, followed by
the US banks with a 12% and German banks at 11%.3 Similarly, in
the Japanese domestic market, banks still play a dominant role in
the Japanese ﬁnancial markets, where in 2009 banks’ share was
64.9% of the total fund-raising and 64.2% of the total loan.
The Japanese ﬁnancial systems consist of both public institu-
tions (namely, government ﬁnancial institutions, joint corpora-
tions by local governments, development banks, etc.) and private
institutions (deposit taking institutions and other ﬁnancial institu-
tions). The Japanese banking sector essentially consists of a dozen
major and internationally oriented banks and more than a hundred
much smaller regional banks. More speciﬁcally, city banks are typ-
ical large universal banks with international exposure and they
provide a wide range of banking services, including retail, corpo-
rate and investment banking services to the large companies in
Japan. Regional banks are divided into two associations, the Regio-
nal Bank Association of Japan and the Second Association of Regio-
nal Banks. The Regional Bank Association and the Second
Association of Regional Banks are smaller in terms of the asset size
and market share, and tend to focus on retail banking to small and
medium sized companies at the regional level. The main distinc-
tion between regional banks is by size, where Second Association
of Regional Banks serves even smaller companies and individuals
within their immediate geographical regions.4 Long Term Credit
banks provide medium and long-term ﬁnance at low rates to the cor-
porate sector.5 Trust banks are a particular type of banks that pro-
vide conventional banking services but their main focus is on asset
management for retail and other customers.6
Table 1 shows banks’ proﬁtability and non-performing loans
proportions for Japanese banks operating from 2001 to 2012.
Table 1 (Panel A) summarizes sector proﬁtability, presented via
operating proﬁts across different types of banks, from which we
can observe that banks’ proﬁtability declined across all banks since
2001. Figures are somewhat better for Regional banks (both asso-
ciations) and might indicate that these banks have better absorbed
or handled large write-off of NPLs, compared to City banks.
Table 1 (Panel B) shows the proportion of NPLs, indicating that
the NPL ratio peaked in the end of 2001 at 9% for the Second Asso-
ciation of Regional Banks and 8.7% for City banks. Furthermore, we
can also see that the Regional Bank Association and Second Associ-
ation of Regional Banks showed the highest proportion of non-per-
forming loans in the period 2001–2012. It is important to note that
even though the ratio of total loans to NPLs remains twice higher
for smaller Regional banks, overall levels of NPLs are several times
lower compared to the starting point.
3. Empirical approach
The shareholder value concept is based on the work of Marshall
(1890), but later modiﬁed for the banking industry in Europe by
Fiordelisi (2007), and Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010). However,
such a concept can only be adopted for publicly traded companies
and this creates limitations for evaluating the value creation inFor more information, please see Casu et al. (2006).
6 Due to speciﬁc focus of Trust banks and Long Term Credit banks as special
institutions within Japanese ﬁnancial system, their very small number (compared to
the other bank types in our sample) and market share, we do not include them in our
analysis.
Table 1
Proﬁtability and non-performing loans in the Japanese banking sector. Source: Financial Service Agency.
FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012
Panel A: operating proﬁts across different types of banks (trillion yen)
City banks 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8
Regional banks 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Regional banks II 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
All banks 6.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.1 3.8 4.7 5.0 4.9 5.0
Panel B: non-performing loans across different types of banks (NPL ratio, %)
City banks 8.7 7.3 5.3 3.0 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8
Regional banks 7.7 7.6 6.8 5.5 4.4 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9
Regional banks II 9.0 8.9 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.8
All banks 8.4 7.4 5.8 4.0 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3
8 More speciﬁcally, bank net operating proﬁts are calculated as a sum of [ordinary
proﬁt (1 – tax rate), R&D, training expenses and operating lease expenses, provision of
allowance for loan losses (minus the written-off of loans), income taxes-current and
general reserve for possible loan losses]; invested capital is calculated as a sum of
[shareholders’ equity, capitalized R&D expenses and capitalized training expenses
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banks exist. Therefore, we follow the aforementioned studies to
some extent but differentiate in the way that we calculate cost of
capital for both listed and non-listed banks to achieve a compre-
hensive assessment of the value creation process in the Japan. As
deﬁned by Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), a common measure
of shareholder value creation is Economic Value Added (EVA),
deﬁned in our case as the Yen surplus value created by a bank on
its existing investments. EVA (as deﬁned in the Eq. (1)) is calcu-
lated as the difference between an ‘‘economic measure’’ of the
bank net operating proﬁts after taxes (NOPAT) and a capital charge
over the same period, i.e. the product of invested capital at time
t  1 (CI) and the estimated cost of capital (k)7.
EVAt1;t ¼ NOPATt1;t  ðkt1;t  CIt1Þ ð1Þ
We estimate the economic proﬁts by following the procedure
proposed by Fiordelisi (2007) that accounts for banking speciﬁc
features. Bank economic proﬁts are obtained by adjusting account-
ing net operating proﬁts to deal with various distortions (i.e.
adjustments covering loan-loss provisions, loan-loss reserves; gen-
eral risk reserves; R&D expenses and operating lease expenses).
Regarding the second component, we estimate the cost of equity
as the shadow price of equity. As noted by Hughes and Mester
(2013), the shadow price of equity will equal the market price
when the amount of equity minimizes cost or maximizes proﬁt,
but even when that is not the case, the shadow price nevertheless
provides a measure of its opportunity cost. We estimate this mea-
sure estimating the bank cost (TC) function including the level of
Equity (E) as a ﬁxed input: this enables us to measure of the sha-
dow cost of equity capital as:
wk ¼ 
@ Ci;t
@Ei;t
¼ ½@ ln cðy;w; E; tÞ=@ ln E ð2Þ
where, the subscripts i and t refer to the bank and the time period,
respectively. Following Battese and Coelli (1995) we estimate the
cost function using the translog functional function (for more info
on the estimation please see Appendix A). As such, the shadow cost
of equity is a measure of how much banks are willing to pay for
equity since it indicates the amount that they would save in other
costs as a result of an increase in the level of equity.
Regarding the third component, we estimate the invested capi-
tal as the total equity calculated following the Basel II deﬁnition:
speciﬁcally, we calculate the invested capital as the sum of the pri-
mary bank capital (i.e. total equity plus disclosed reserves) and the7 In Japan, we ﬁnd that some banks have a negative cost of capital (due to the
severe crisis of some banks) that is counterintuitive. In the EVA calculation, this
would imply to add a positive capital charge to NOPAT (formula (1)) that has no
economic meaning, as such we opt to remove these banks (zombie banks) from our
sample in order to fully capture how various components might be driving the EVA.
We are thankful to one of the two referees for this valuable comment.secondary bank capital (i.e. the sum of undisclosed reserves, gen-
eral loss reserves, subordinated term debt).8
In order to investigate the determinants of shareholder value in
Japan we specify a linear model of bank performance, as is found in
the established empirical literature on the determinants of bank
performance (e.g. Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Brissimis et al.,
2008; Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010). We estimate the following
model where the bank’s shareholder value is a function of various
bank-risk exposure, bank-speciﬁc and macroeconomic-variables:
lnðyi;tÞ ¼ aþ
X2
j¼1
bj lnðyi;tjÞ þ
X2
j¼1
vjDx eff i;tj þ
X2
j¼1
djDs eff i;tj
þ
X2
j¼1
/jCRi;tj þ cLIQ i;t1 þ gMRi;t1
þ jIDi;t1 þ k ln ðBASÞi;t1 þ m ln ðNOEÞi;t1
þ h ln ðGDPÞi;t þ qINFi;t þ ei;t ð3Þ
where, i subscript denotes the cross-section dimension, t denotes
the time dimension. The bank-speciﬁc variables include: bank’s
shareholder value variable (y) which is calculated as a ratio
between the EVA and capital invested in the bank, net operating
proﬁts and the cost of capital (part of the EVA); cost and revenue
efﬁciency changes over two consecutive periods (x-eff and s-eff
respectively); risk-speciﬁc factors include: (CR) is an aggregate
measure of bad loans, (LIQ) is an aggregate measure of liquid assets;
(MR) is a market risk indicator. Other bank-speciﬁc indicators
include: (ID) is an income diversiﬁcation measure9; (BAS) is bank
asset size; and ln(NOE) is the natural logarithm of the number of
employees. Finally, ln(GDP) is the natural logarithm of GDP growth;
INF is the natural logarithm of the rate of inﬂation, and ei,t is the ran-
dom error term. A detailed summary of the all variables used for the
empirical investigation is provided in Table 2.
Regarding the ﬁrst potential driver of shareholder value crea-
tion, we recognize that efﬁciency is likely to have an impact on
bank performance (e.g. Berger and Mester, 2003; Beccalli et al.,
2006; Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2010). Cost, revenue, alternative
proﬁt and shareholder value efﬁciency levels are estimated using
the Stochastic Frontier approach. These measures are used as(minus the proxy for amortized R&D expenses and minus the proxy for amortized
training expenses), proxy for the present value of expected lease commitments over
time (minus the proxy for amortized operating lease commitments), net loan loss
reserve, deferred tax (minus the deferred tax debits), and + general reserve for
possible loan losses].
9 Regarding bank diversiﬁcation we follow approach similar to Berger et al. (2010)
in order to estimate bank income diversiﬁcation.
Table 2
Variables used to investigate shareholder value and its determinants in Japanese banking.
Variables Symbol Description
Economic Value Added w w is the EVA and represents the difference between net operating proﬁts and a capital charge over the same period
Net operating proﬁt p p is the measure of bank net operating proﬁts
Cost of capital k k is the bank’s cost of equity capital
Shareholder value efﬁciency w-eff w-eff are obtained using Stochastic Frontier analysis*
Cost efﬁciency x-eff x-eff are obtained using Stochastic Frontier analysis*
Revenue efﬁciency s-eff s-eff are obtained using Stochastic Frontier analysis*
Proﬁt efﬁciency p-eff p-eff are obtained using Stochastic Frontier analysis *
Credit risk overall CR NPL are calculated as: (risk-monitored loans + loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy + past due loans in arrears by 6 months
or more + restructured loans + bankrupt and quasi-bankrupt assets + doubtful assets + substandard loans)/total assets
Liquidity risk overall LIQ LR is calculated as: (cash and due from banks + call loans + receivables under resale agreements + receivables under securities
borrowing transactions + bills bought + monetary claims bought + trading assets + money held in trust)/(total demand
deposits)
Market risk overall MR MR is calculated as: (government bonds + local government bonds + short-term corporate bonds + corporate bonds + stocks)/
(total assets  tangible ﬁxed assets  intangible ﬁxed assets)
Income diversiﬁcation ID ID is a measure of bank diversiﬁcation focusing on its income, calculated as:
ID = (interest on loans and discounts/income)2 + (interest and dividends on securities/income)2 + (other interest income/
income)2 + (fees and commissions/income)2 + (trading income/income)2 + (other operating income/income)2 + (other income/
income)2
Bank assets size BAS BAS is the natural logarithm of the total assets
Number of employees NOE NOE is the natural logarithm of the number of employees
GDP growth GDP The growth in GDP (annual %)
Inﬂation INF Rate of inﬂation (annual %)
* More detail for the estimation procedures are provided in the Appendix A.
Table 3
Overview of the selected sample.
Bank type/year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total number of
observations
Total assets of the
average bank*
Full sample 136 136 134 133 129 127 124 123 122 122 119 119 119 1643 6,092,976
City banks 9 9 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 88 60,947,667
Regional banks 64 64 64 64 63 63 63 63 63 64 63 63 63 824 3,369,457
Regional-1 32 32 32 32 31 31 31 31 31 32 31 32 32 410 3,535,855
Regional-2 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 31 31 414 3,204,667
Regional banks II 54 54 55 53 50 48 47 46 45 44 42 42 42 622 1,253,450
Regional II-1 26 26 27 27 25 24 24 23 23 22 21 21 21 310 1,433,845
Regional II-2 28 28 28 26 25 24 23 23 22 22 21 21 21 312 1,075,360
* All values are in million yen.
Table 4
Annual shadow price of equity.
Year Shadow price of equity (full
sample)
Shadow price of equity (City
banks)
Shadow price of equity (Regional
banks)
Shadow price of equity (Regional II
banks)
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
1999 0.0286 0.0044 0.0262 0.0070 0.0077 0.0041 0.0624 0.0064
2000 0.0303 0.0041 0.0393 0.0095 0.0122 0.0043 0.0634 0.0046
2001 0.0419 0.0043 0.0188 0.0104 0.0226 0.0050 0.0721 0.0056
2002 0.0470 0.0045 0.0246 0.0149 0.0305 0.0051 0.0765 0.0058
2003 0.0497 0.0044 0.0362 0.0118 0.0372 0.0053 0.0775 0.0051
2004 0.0545 0.0044 0.0220 0.0150 0.0409 0.0051 0.0834 0.0052
2005 0.0564 0.0042 0.0107 0.0167 0.0418 0.0050 0.0846 0.0050
2006 0.0462 0.0040 0.0110 0.0098 0.0329 0.0050 0.0719 0.0051
2007 0.0488 0.0040 0.0076 0.0078 0.0381 0.0050 0.0712 0.0051
2008 0.0508 0.0039 0.0142 0.0083 0.0414 0.0047 0.0733 0.0050
2009 0.0522 0.0039 0.0201 0.0119 0.0440 0.0044 0.0756 0.0048
2010 0.0580 0.0037 0.0151 0.0105 0.0501 0.0043 0.0808 0.0046
2011 0.0613 0.0040 0.0108 0.0103 0.0534 0.0045 0.0840 0.0055
Mean 0.0477 0.0012 0.0209 0.0031 0.0348 0.0014 0.0748 0.0015
Note: Regional banks – Regional Bank Association of Japan; Regional II banks – Second Association of Regional Banks.
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established literature (e.g. Salas and Saurina, 2003; Athanasoglou
et al., 2008) we assume that bank’s risk-taking has a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the ability to generate returns. We focus on varioustypes of risk, but more speciﬁcally, we control for the quality of
the loan portfolio through the measurement of credit risk, liquidity
and market risk exposure via aggregated liquid assets and various
securities respectively. We believe that credit risk represents
Fig. 1. Shadow price of equity: listed vs. non-listed banks.
Table 5
Shareholder value, cost, revenue and proﬁt efﬁciency in Japanese banking between
1999 and 2011.
Shareholder value Cost Revenue Proﬁt
Panel A: City banks vs. Regional banks
Full sample
Mean 0.5955 0.9615 0.9309 0.8058
SD 0.0210 0.0265 0.0471 0.0881
Min 0.0000 0.6458 0.5862 0.0000
Max 0.7316 0.9980 0.9878 0.9842
City banks
Mean 0.5867 0.9780 0.9043 0.6833
SD 0.0793 0.0196 0.0828 0.2584
Min 0.0000 0.9020 0.5960 0.0000
Max 0.7316 0.9980 0.9763 0.9842
Regional banks
Mean 0.5962 0.9671 0.9265 0.8110
SD 0.0112 0.0228 0.0456 0.0536
Min 0.5487 0.6458 0.5862 0.4866
Max 0.7021 0.9945 0.9878 0.9791
Regional banks II
Mean 0.5959 0.9517 0.9403 0.8163
SD 0.0058 0.0285 0.0393 0.0612
Min 0.5492 0.8010 0.6744 0.3887
Max 0.6374 0.9934 0.9863 0.9814
Panel A: listed banks vs. non-listed banks
Listed banks
Mean 0.5954 0.9653 0.9327 0.7999
SD 0.0241 0.0216 0.0441 0.0938
Min 0.0000 0.8010 0.5862 0.0000
Max 0.7316 0.9980 0.9787 0.9842
Non-listed banks
Mean 0.5959 0.9512 0.9256 0.8219
SD 0.0078 0.0346 0.0543 0.0680
Min 0.5492 0.6458 0.6744 0.4646
Max 0.6607 0.9945 0.9878 0.9814
Table 6
The relationship between shareholder value and its determinants.
Dependent variable (1) y = yi (2) y = yi (3) y = yi
yt1 0.3828⁄⁄⁄ 0.0145 0.3394⁄⁄
(0.0985) (0.1014) (0.1422)
yt2 0.0375 0.2274⁄⁄⁄ 0.0270
(0.0531) (0.0372) (0.0699)
Dx-efft1 0.4618⁄⁄ 0.3542⁄⁄
(0.2310) (0.1532)
Dx-efft2 0.2544⁄ 0.3696⁄⁄⁄
(0.1391) (0.1324)
Ds-efft1 0.1754 0.3882⁄⁄
(0.5790) (0.1585)
Ds-efft2 0.0447 0.0271
(0.3996) (0.1710)
CRt1 0.1999 0.0969 0.2835
(0.2641) (0.3096) (0.4386)
CRt2 0.2486⁄⁄ 0.2182⁄⁄ 0.5469⁄⁄
(0.0980) (0.1037) (0.2690)
LIQt1 0.0908 0.0148 0.1384⁄
(0.0831) (0.0485) (0.0726)
MRt1 0.1549 0.0351 0.5371⁄⁄⁄
(0.3465) (0.3043) (0.1990)
IDt1 0.3868 1.2846⁄⁄ 0.2683
(0.4611) (0.5295) (0.2454)
ln(BAS)t1 0.1708⁄⁄⁄ 0.0143 0.0594
(0.0619) (0.0650) (0.0514)
ln(NOE)t1 0.1268 0.0620 0.1245⁄
(0.1068) (0.0998) (0.0738)
ln(GDP) 1.1147 3.0013⁄⁄⁄ 2.6335⁄⁄⁄
(0.9051) (0.6577) (0.6005)
INF 0.4083 1.2418⁄⁄ 0.8583
(0.4846) (0.4938) (0.5378)
CONS 1.0293 0.6412 0.2423
(1.0248) (0.6954) (0.3601)
Observations 1017 1017 1017
Hansen test, 2nd step, v2 (p-value) 0.378 0.502 0.275
A-B test AR(1) 0.002 0.014 0.030
A-B test AR(2) 0.993 0.120 0.706
Table 6 reports the results derived from the estimation of Eq. (3) to disentangle the
inter-temporal relationships between bank EVA and its determinants. We estimate
autoregressive models with two lags for the EVA, efﬁciency and risk variables. We
use the two-step GMM estimators developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with
Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). We use three
different measures of EVA: ratio between the EVA and capital invested in the bank
(y), net operating proﬁts (p) and the cost of equity capital (k). Explanatory variables
are deﬁned in Table 2. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM
estimators: the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with
the residuals so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Arellano-Bond (AB) test
for serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that
errors in the ﬁrst difference regression do not exhibit second order serial
correlation. The symbols ⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄⁄⁄ represent signiﬁcance levels of 10%, 5% and
1% respectively.
10 Similar to previous studies (e.g. Berger and De Young, 1997; Williams, 2004) we
assume that three and four lags model do not signiﬁcantly differ from each other, so
we opt for a small number of lags to accommodate for our somewhat small sample
size.
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and/or reduce on the balance sheet, while liquidity and market risk
are seen as short term and can change in relative short period.
Furthermore, we follow Berger et al. (2010) and measure bank
income diversiﬁcation, to assess the link between performance
and diversiﬁcation. Additionally, the variables called bank assets
size and number of employees are indicators of the size and space
dimension for each bank. We opt out to use traditional measure of
size (i.e. assets) and non-conventional measure of space dimension
(i.e. number of employees) in order to better account for large dif-
ferences in size and labor force across Japanese banking industry.
Finally, as proposed by various studies (e.g. Salas and Saurina,
2003; Brissimis et al., 2008), we include some macro-economic
variables as covariates in our analysis as control variables. Theseinclude annual real GDP growth to take account of business cycle
effects and the inﬂation rate in order to control for the stance of
monetary policy.
We assume that for any bank risk or bank speciﬁc factor to have
inﬂuence on the value creation process introduction of time
through small number of lags is necessary.10 However, the intro-
duction of a lagged dependent variable among the predictors might
create complications in the estimation as the lagged dependent var-
iable is correlated with the disturbance (even under the assumption
that ei,t is not itself correlated). In order to tackle this problemwe use
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators developed
for dynamic panel models (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998). Speciﬁcally we use the two-step system GMM
Table 7
The relationship between net operating proﬁts (and cost of equity capital) and its determinants.
Dependent variable (1) y = p (2) y = p (3) y = p Dependent variable (4) y = k (5) y = k (6) y = k
pt1 0.0720⁄⁄⁄ 0.0364⁄⁄⁄ 0.0721⁄⁄⁄ kt1 0.6226⁄⁄⁄ 0.5789⁄⁄⁄ 0.4042⁄⁄⁄
(0.0079) (0.0067) (0.00907) (0.0711) (0.0661) (0.0805)
pt2 0.0170⁄ 0.0052 0.0168⁄⁄ kt2 0.0409 0.0187 0.1329⁄⁄
(0.0095) (0.0064) (0.00848) (0.0599) (0.0490) (0.0521)
Dx-efft1 0.2276 1.4040 Dx-efft1 0.0656⁄⁄⁄ 0.0478⁄
(0.6126) (1.0181) (0.0243) (0.0287)
Dx-efft2 0.5534 1.1766⁄⁄ Dx-efft2 0.0691⁄⁄⁄ 0.0490⁄⁄
(0.3609) (0.5679) (0.0204) (0.0234)
Ds-efft1 0.5570⁄ 0.535⁄ Ds-efft1 0.0334 0.1681⁄⁄
(0.3145) (0.301) (0.0605) (0.0756)
Ds-efft2 0.4588⁄ 0.460⁄ Ds-efft2 0.0918⁄ 0.0264
(0.2747) (0.254) (0.0542) (0.0632)
CRt1 0.2556 0.3084 0.00144 CRt1 0.0230 0.0231 0.0057
(1.8120) (0.8100) (1.679) (0.0390) (0.0414) (0.0367)
CRt2 1.3715 0.5258 1.146 CRt2 0.0470⁄⁄ 0.0004 0.0479⁄⁄
(1.5953) (0.6660) (1.583) (0.0211) (0.0158) (0.0203)
LIQt1 0.1112 0.6736⁄⁄⁄ 0.131 LIQt1 0.0065 0.0388⁄⁄⁄ 0.0541⁄⁄⁄
(0.3864) (0.2391) (0.348) (0.0159) (0.0141) (0.0188)
MRt1 0.3638 1.1766⁄⁄⁄ 0.308 MRt1 0.1321⁄⁄ 0.1153⁄⁄ 0.0699
(0.8263) (0.4010) (0.793) (0.0590) (0.0531) (0.0491)
IDt1 0.9328 1.8090 0.827 IDt1 0.0195 0.0009 0.0785
(0.9586) (1.2779) (0.802) (0.0809) (0.0698) (0.1150)
ln(BAS)t1 0.1063 0.0775 0.0740 ln (BAS)t1 0.0204⁄ 0.0052 0.0154
(0.1084) (0.1861) (0.0985) (0.0120) (0.0087) (0.0167)
ln(NOE)t1 0.4492⁄⁄ 0.2682 0.414⁄⁄ ln(NOE)t1 0.0251 0.0149 0.0195
(0.1765) (0.2634) (0.162) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0294)
ln(GDP) 1.9946 0.7655 2.368⁄ ln(GDP) 0.5544⁄⁄⁄ 0.5603⁄⁄⁄ 0.4909⁄⁄
(1.4487) (1.1637) (1.365) (0.1504) (0.1346) (0.2014)
INF 4.3780 1.9190 4.455 INF 0.2719⁄⁄⁄ 0.2293⁄⁄⁄ 0.1165
(3.3116) (1.4367) (2.935) (0.0863) (0.0785) (0.1215)
CONS 9.5491⁄⁄⁄ 11.5380⁄⁄⁄ 9.598⁄⁄⁄ CONS 0.0588 0.1683⁄⁄ 0.5838⁄⁄⁄
(0.8709) (1.8440) (0.631) (0.1266) (0.0696) (0.1518)
Observations 1017 1017 1017 1017 1017 1017
Hansen test, 2nd step, v2 (p-value) 0.286 0.885 0.259 0.280 0.190 0.373
A-B test AR(1) 0.040 0.062 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
A-B test AR(2) 0.836 0.152 0.780 0.669 0.812 0.532
Table 7 reports the results derived from the estimation of Eq. (3) to disentangle the inter-temporal relationships between bank EVA and its determinants. We estimate
autoregressive models with two lags for the EVA, efﬁciency and risk variables. We use the two-step GMM estimators developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) withWindmeijer
(2005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). We use three different measures of EVA: ratio between the EVA and capital invested in the bank (y), net operating
proﬁts (p) and the cost of equity capital (k). Explanatory variables are deﬁned in Table 2. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators: the null
hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Arellano-Bond (AB) test for serial correlation in the
ﬁrst-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that errors in the ﬁrst difference regression do not exhibit second order serial correlation. The symbols ⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄⁄⁄ represent
signiﬁcance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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robust statistical inference, we also report the statistics for the Han-
sen test of over-identifying restrictions, and the second-order auto-
correlation test of no second-order autocorrelation in the error
term (Hansen, 1982).11
Finally, for a robustness checks we disentangle our dependent
variable, EVA, into its two main components [i.e. bank net operat-
ing proﬁts (NOPAT) and the estimated cost of capital (k)] which we
then use as dependent variables in the model 3 in order to
investigate whether proﬁts or the cost of equity are inﬂuenced
by similar factors.4. Data and empirical results
The data used in the empirical analysis was drawn from the
Bank of Japan and the Japanese Bankers Association with particular
focus on commercial banks between 1999 and 2011. Table 3
reports the breakdown by bank type of the number of observations
and asset size of the banks included in the sample.12 Overall, our11 We also check for stationarity by applying Fisher’s type unit root test for
unbalanced panel data, as developed by Maddala and Wu (1999).
12 We account for the vast majority of operating banks in the observed period
(Table 3), from the overall sample of commercial banks available from Japanese
Bankers Association.sample comprises 1643 bank observations. The City banks are the
biggest on average by asset size, whereas the Regional banks group
has the largest number of institutions in total.
Table 4, reports the estimated cost of equity across the desig-
nated time period in comparison to various benchmark mea-
sures, such as City banks vs. Regional banks. At the sample
mean, the shadow price on equity (i.e. the negative log derivative
of the cost function) is between 2.8% and 6.1%. For the City
banks, the cost of equity over time is signiﬁcantly negative.
These results are in line with Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), but
might also be due to the fact that the proﬁts of many banks were
low or negative in these periods. Furthermore, the banks’ use of
equity capital does not interact signiﬁcantly with the marginal
cost of loans in the sample, but it does correlate negatively with
the price of borrowed funds, and it has reacted strongly with the
passing of time. All of the variables involving the level of equity
impact signiﬁcantly on costs. Lastly, if we divide the sample as
listed vs. non-listed banks, the differences between two sub-
groups are even greater. Speciﬁcally, cost of equity for non-listed
banks is double the cost of the listed banks (see Fig. 1). This
could be the direct result of bad lending practices and govern-
ment subsidies for larger banks.
Table 5 reports our mean shareholder value, cost, revenue and
proﬁt efﬁciency estimates by bank type and by listed banks. Over
the period analyzed the range of efﬁciency levels appears to be
Table 8
The relationship between shareholder value and its determinants focusing on proﬁt
efﬁciency.
Dependent variable (1) y = yi (2) y = p (3) y = k
yt1 0.3934⁄⁄⁄ 0.0661⁄⁄⁄ 0.5418⁄⁄⁄
(0.0875) (0.0140) (0.0632)
yt2 0.0420 0.0050 0.0259
(0.0577) (0.0103) (0.0559)
Dp-efft1 0.1770⁄ 0.2270 0.0411⁄⁄
(0.1051) (0.1888) (0.0195)
Dp-efft2 0.1099⁄⁄⁄ 0.3572⁄⁄⁄ 0.0085
(0.0351) (0.1243) (0.0106)
CRt1 0.2419 0.1726 0.0159
(0.2494) (1.5662) (0.0400)
CRt2 0.1615 1.7903 0.0257⁄
(0.1070) (2.1395) (0.0149)
LIQt1 0.1025 0.1102 0.0496⁄⁄⁄
(0.0848) (0.2535) (0.0136)
MRt1 0.0107 0.1250 0.1283⁄⁄⁄
(0.4109) (0.4508) (0.0442)
IDt1 0.6397⁄⁄ 0.1765 0.0232
(0.3258) (0.4401) (0.0788)
ln(BAS)t1 0.2162⁄⁄⁄ 0.3605⁄ 0.0051
(0.0561) (0.1839) (0.0106)
ln(NOE)t1 0.1932⁄⁄ 0.2659 0.0092
(0.0900) (0.2267) (0.0171)
ln(GDP) 1.1211⁄ 1.5127 0.6537⁄⁄⁄
(0.6701) (1.1654) (0.1453)
INF 0.2565 1.3688 0.1811⁄
(0.4180) (2.0984) (0.0969)
CONS 1.9111⁄⁄⁄ 7.4737⁄⁄⁄ 0.2294⁄⁄⁄
(0.6733) (0.9947) (0.0809)
Observations 1017 1017 1017
Hansen test, 2nd step, v2 (p-value) 0.403 0.506 0.326
A-B test AR(1) 0.003 0.077 0.000
A-B test AR(2) 0.852 0.817 0.668
Table 8 reports the results derived from the estimation of Eq. (3) to disentangle the
inter-temporal relationships between bank EVA and its determinants. We estimate
autoregressive models with two lags for the EVA, efﬁciency and risk variables. We
use the two-step GMM estimators developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) with
Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard error (reported in brackets). We use three
different measures of EVA: ratio between the EVA and capital invested in the bank
(y), net operating proﬁts (p) and the cost of equity capital (k). Explanatory variables
are deﬁned in Table 2. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions for the GMM
estimators: the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with
the residuals so the over-identifying restrictions are valid. Arellano-Bond (AB) test
for serial correlation in the ﬁrst-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is that
errors in the ﬁrst difference regression do not exhibit second order serial
correlation. The symbols ⁄, ⁄⁄, and ⁄⁄⁄ represent signiﬁcance levels of 10%, 5% and
1% respectively.
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cally, mean cost inefﬁciency estimates range between 3% (City
banks) and 5% (Regional banks II) and these results are generally
higher than existing studies on Japanese banking (i.e. Drake and
Hall, 2003; Altunbas et al., 2000). Further, mean revenue efﬁciency
estimates range between 90% (City banks) and 94% (Regional banks
II). The proﬁt efﬁciency scores over the sample period appear typ-
ically in line with those found in other studies on commercial
banks (i.e. Drake et al., 2009), with a mean value of 80% for the full
sample and a minimum value of 68% for city banks, which appear
to be the least proﬁt efﬁcient bank type in our sample. The results
also show that non-listed banks are more efﬁcient then listed
banks, which is to be expected due to their somewhat limited
access to capital.
Furthermore, shareholder efﬁciency scores range between 58%
(City banks) and 60% (Regional banks). Interestingly, on average
it can be seen that Japanese banks squander more than one third
of their potential shareholder value between 1999 and 2011. This
is also true across different bank types. Similarly, listed institutions
show no improvement to non-listed ones, indicating that banks in
Japan could create at least 40% greater shareholder value for their
owners if they operated at best-practice. These results just empha-
size the enormous inﬂuence of bad loans on the efﬁciency and
shareholder value in Japanese banking.
Lastly, Tables 6 and 7 report the results obtained from estimat-
ing the EVA and its components as dependent variables. Focusing
on the Table 6, we notice that various factors have been found
important in driving the shareholder value up. Namely, the share-
holder value measure has been positively related to the cost efﬁ-
ciency and credit risk in the main model, and macroeconomic
indicators in the reduced models (at the 10% level or less), while
negatively related to the bank size, income diversiﬁcation and
revenue efﬁciency (at the 10% level or less). Some of these results
are in line with the existing literature on European banking,
namely Fiordelisi and Molyneux (2010), where results conﬁrm
that cost efﬁciency gains are driving the shareholder value. Other
results are quite novel and unexpected. Bank assets size (in the
main model 1) and revenue efﬁciency improvements (in the
reduced model 3) are negatively linked to the EVA models and
this might require special attention from the future studies. A
possible explanation why larger banks have lower value creation
might be that the size improvements are subsidized via share-
holder value, implying that some banks might be involved in
the empire building while other banks possibly belong to larger
business groups (keiretsu) and therefore follow their own
agenda.13
Our estimates for net operating proﬁts, in Table 7, are positively
related to the number of employees (in both the main and in the
reduced model 3) and cost efﬁciency, liquidity and market risk
exposure (in reduced model 2), while negatively related to revenue
efﬁciency improvements (in both the main and in the reduced
model 3). Some of these results are in line with Fiordelisi and
Molyneux (2010), and they also further highlight the importance
of risk management in banking in achieving higher proﬁt rates.
Regarding the net operating proﬁts’ positive link with the liquidity
and market exposure, we can conclude that Japanese banks beneﬁt
greatly from the higher level of liquid assets and greater involve-
ment in the ﬁnancial markets. Additionally, the negative link
between revenue efﬁciency gains and proﬁts, cannot be properly
assessed without considering how quickly actions pays-off and
other externalities that might be affecting the relationship (such13 For more info on the Japanese business group afﬁliations and their strengths,
please see Aggarwal and Dow (2012).as higher cost of capital, bad lending practices and government
interventions).
Various factors are found to be statistically signiﬁcant drivers
for the cost of equity capital. Namely, bank assets size and a 2-year
lagged credit losses are found to have a positive impact on the
implied cost of capital (Table 7, models 4 and 6), potentially indi-
cating continuously poor loan portfolio quality as a result of rather
complex governance structure (consistent with Chen et al. (2009)).
In contrast, liquidity and market risk exposure are found to have a
negative effect on the cost of capital, and only further conﬁrm the
trade-off between proﬁts and equity cost via liquidity and market
exposure. Another interesting result is that lower cost efﬁciency
gains could be driving the cost of equity capital up.
Regarding the bank speciﬁc factors, there is a negative relation-
ship between bank asset size and EVA, indicating that the smaller
banks appear to have a higher value creation. It is also found that
the EVA is not inﬂuenced by higher number of employees, poten-
tially indicating that shareholders in Japan do not beneﬁt from
practices that concentrate on lowering the number of employees
(signiﬁcance at the 10% level or less). Furthermore, we also ﬁnd
that operating proﬁts can be improved if further labor force is
employed.
Fig. 2. Comparing cost of capital estimates for listed banks: SROE vs. CAPM.
206 N. Radic´ / Journal of Banking & Finance 52 (2015) 199–2075. Robustness checks
In order to further conﬁrm the aforementioned ﬁndings, we
conduct some additional robustness checks. Firstly, we assess var-
ious alternative models with a smaller number of parameters by
using only one regressor of changes in efﬁciencies (rather than
all of them). Tables 6 and 7 show that our estimated coefﬁcients
and their signiﬁcance for the three main models (shareholder
value, net operating proﬁts and cost of equity capital) are consis-
tent with those from reduced models, yielding almost the same
signs and magnitudes.
Secondly, in order to further conﬁrm our results we test for sen-
sitivity to the type of efﬁciency measure adopted and replace cost
and revenue efﬁciency variables with the proﬁt efﬁciency measure.
As shown in the Table 8, our ﬁndings are consistent across various
efﬁciency measures. For example, only actions directed to increase
cost efﬁciency display a positive impact on EVA, while revenue and
proﬁt efﬁciency gains will make no impact.
Thirdly, we compare our measure of cost of capital (i.e. shadow
price of equity) with cost of capital for listed banks in Japan based
on the CAPM model. In order to estimate this standard measure of
cost of capital we use DataStream database for weekly prices for
listed banks and NIKKEI 500 weekly price index to calculate
returns; and Bank of Japan data for short term money market rate
for risk free rate. Fig. 2 shows that our ﬁndings are fairly consistent
with traditional cost of capital estimates. Both methods have the
same time trend pattern and CAPMmethod yields somewhat lower
estimates for cost of capital (i.e. 1–3% on average across observed
period).6. Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the shareholder value efﬁ-
ciency and determinants of shareholder value creation for the Jap-
anese banking industry, using more robust and innovative
methodologies. We base our analysis on the broad sample of both
listed and non-listed Japanese banks between 1999 and 2011.
Firstly, we ﬁnd that the sample mean of the shadow price of
equity is between 2.8% and 6.1%, and that costs have increased sig-
niﬁcantly over the analysed period. We test for the differences in
the listed versus non-listed banks, and ﬁnd that cost of equity for
non-listed banks is double the cost of listed banks. Our results
for shadow price on equity are also very similar to the traditional
cost of capital estimates (i.e. CAPM).
Secondly, our cost inefﬁciency estimates range between 3% and
5%, revenue efﬁciency estimates range between 90% (City banks)
and 94% (Regional banks II), while proﬁt efﬁciency scores over
the sample period range between 80% for the full sample and
68% for city banks. We also ﬁnd that Japanese banks squandermore than one third of their potential shareholder value, and that
this is true across different bank types.
Thirdly, cost efﬁciency, credit risk and bank size are found to be
the most important factors in explaining the value creation in
Japan, while income diversiﬁcation, liquidity and market risk expo-
sure seems to matter for shareholder value creation in the reduced
models. Interestingly, our results indicate that the smaller banks
appear to have a higher value creation. It is also found that the
higher number of employees do not hinder value creation for Jap-
anese banks. Further, our results for net operating proﬁts show
that they beneﬁt greatly from the cost efﬁciency gains, higher level
of liquid assets and greater involvement in the ﬁnancial markets.
Another interesting result is that the cost of equity capital could
be reduced by improving the cost efﬁciency.
Different policy implications can emerge from the study. First,
we show that the Japanese banks are on average around 40% share-
holder value inefﬁcient, and thus, government policies aimed at
aiding the industry in order to foster higher improvements for
these banks should be reassessed. Second, cost of equity for non-
listed banks is double the cost of the listed banks, signaling that
continuous government subsidies for larger banks should be recon-
sidered and their impact extensively monitored in the years to
come. Finally, future policies and studies should try to investigate
the negative impact of proﬁt efﬁciency improvements on the EVA
models.
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Efﬁciency is measured using the Stochastic Frontier (SF) analy-
sis and, namely, Battese and Coelli (1995) Stochastic Frontier
model. We use the following translog functional form:
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þ
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where TP is the logarithm of the net proﬁts, or cost of production, yi
(i = 1, 2, 3) are output quantities, wj (j = 1, 2, 3) are input prices, ki
(i = 1, 2, . . ., 6) are bank speciﬁc factor inﬂuencing the efﬁciency
estimation, lnE is the natural logarithm of total equity capital, Zi
are ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors assuming different values for each ﬁrm, T
is the time trend, uc are the cost inefﬁciency components. Symmetry
and linear homogeneity restrictions are imposed standardizing
shareholder value (EVA), total proﬁts (TP), total costs (TC) and input
prices Pi by the last input price.
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added approach, originally proposed by Berger and Humphrey
(1992). We posit that labor, capital and funds are inputs14, whereas
we have three asset based outputs: loans (y1), securities (y2) and off-
balance sheet activities (y3); and we treat the level of equity capital
as the critical quasi-ﬁxed input. We also estimate the alternative
proﬁt and shareholder value efﬁciency measures introduced applied
to banks by Berger and Mester (1997), Humphrey and Pulley (1997)
and Fiordelisi (2007). The proﬁt and shareholder value efﬁciencies
are estimated by calculating the alternative proﬁt functional model
adopted for the cost efﬁciency15, by using as dependent variable:
1) the ln(TP) in the proﬁt function, and 2) the ln(EVA) in the share-
holder value function.16 In order to account for heterogeneity in the
sample ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors are assumed to have a direct inﬂuence
on the production structure. As such, we include some control vari-
ables in the deterministic portion of the Stochastic Frontier function
in Eq. (4), namely we account for presence of non-performing loans
on the balance sheet (in line with the existing studies on Japan, like
for example, Fukuyama and Weber (2008) or Barros et al. (2012)).
We posit that the presence of large volume of bad loans would inev-
itably lead to destruction of shareholder value and poor perfor-
mance, and if omitted from the equation might lead to biased
results.17
We estimate shadow cost of equity capital by using a simpliﬁed
version of the previous bank cost function by including only the
level of equity as a ﬁxed input but not including the additional fac-
tors into the deterministic portion of the cost function. Thus, we
exclude M-ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors from the formula (4). We aim to
capture only the changes in equity levels, for example during re-
capitalization process, in order to allow for a possible negative sha-
dow price on equity during the various recovery phases in Japanese
banking industry.References
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